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Since 2008, European academics have pointed out a lack of substancein the European Union (EU)-People’s Republic of China (PRC) “com-prehensive strategic partnership.” (1) Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has
proposed his definition of the concept as a “long-term” and “stable” rela-
tionship “transcending the differences in ideology and social system” so
that it is “not subjected to the impact of individual events that occur from
time to time.” (2) From an EU perspective, by contrast, a strategic relation-
ship generally entails cooperation beyond purely bilateral issues, to include
joint action to maintain international peace, security, and global gover-
nance. (3) China’s reluctance to develop a security relationship with the EU
has led to introspective analyses on Europe’s weakness as a security actor,
depicting China as not taking the EU as a relevant strategic partner and
preferring to put narrow economic and technological objectives at the top
of its EU agenda, while Beijing deals with the US more seriously on issues
of international security. This view is currently widely shared in European
foreign policy circles.
Through an assessment of how the modernisation of the People’s Liber-
ation Army Navy (PLAN) impacts Europe’s foreign and security policy in-
terests, this article proposes a nuanced perspective of the EU’s irrelevance
as a security actor in maritime East Asia. Beijing rejects the idea of Euro-
pean involvement in the maritime territorial disputes that undermine re-
gional security, and resists European attempts to include discussions on
Asian security matters on the agenda of EU-China meetings. Chinese aca-
demics generally consider Europe not to be a legitimate security actor in
East Asia. (4)
This article argues that, despite Chinese assertions to the contrary, the
PRC’s naval modernisation intersects with the EU’s foreign and security
policy interests in five main areas:
(1) the international Law of the Sea;
(2) the risks for Europe of being dragged into an Asian maritime conflict
and the safety of European trade with Asian partners;
(3) Europe’s competitiveness on international markets for naval military
systems;
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(4) the potential for maritime security cooperation against non-tradi-
tional threats;
(5) the arms embargo issue and the question of naval technology trans-
fers to China.
So far Europe has only addressed two of these issues: the arms embargo
and the prospects for maritime security cooperation with the PLAN. The
three other issues have been ignored, probably because the EU’s foreign
policy systematically focuses on cooperation, engagement, and trade, and
downplays security and military issues and the long-term evolution of the
global balance of power, which is typically seen as being the preserve of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization despite French attempts to define
a European Security Policy. As a result, none of the main pillars of the EU’s
policy towards China addresses the impact of China’s military modernisa-
tion on Asian regional security, the international order, and European secu-
rity interests.
For purposes of background, the first section of this article describes the
current EU approach towards China’s military modernisation. The second
section, through an analysis based on equipment and technology produc-
tion and acquisition, argues that the modernisation of the PLAN is under-
pinned by the pursuit of a bastion strategy and discusses the implications
for Europe of security turbulence in China’s maritime periphery. The third
section turns to the major contribution of European firms to the moderni-
sation of the PLAN through naval technology transfers. The article then ad-
dresses the prospects for maritime security cooperation between Europe
and China through the case study of the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf
of Aden, and the upcoming Europe/China competition on export markets
for naval technologies. In the fifth section, the article argues that the EU
embargo on arms sales to China is unlikely to be lifted, primarily as a result
of the transatlantic partnership. Finally, the last section explores the con-
sequences for Europe of China’s interpretation of the Law of the Sea, and
argues that Europe has a strong interest to bring China to full compliance
with the UNCLOS.
The paradigm of the EU’s strategic
irrelevance 
The EU’s foreign policy is conceived in normative terms. (5) As far as China
is concerned, the main goal of EU foreign policy is to socialise China to-
wards an acceptance of European political norms of liberal democracy
through engagement. This policy consists of four main pillars defined the
following way on the official webpage of the European External Action
Service: “Engage China further, bilaterally and on the world stage, through
an upgraded political dialogue; support China’s transition to an open soci-
ety based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights; encourage the
integration of China in the world economy through bringing it fully into
the world trading system, and supporting the process of economic and so-
cial reform; raise the EU’s profile in China.” (6) In addition, the EU recognises
that China’s rise as a major power has made it a key partner to address
problems of international security and global governance, with the ulti-
mate goal being a “situation where China and the EU can bring their re-
spective strengths to bear to offer joint solutions to global problems.” (7)
In this line of thought, stronger Chinese naval forces would enable Beijing
to increase its contribution to the international community inasmuch as
the PLAN would be better able to participate in the struggle against such
non-traditional threats as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, and natural disas-
ters. This vision of the future defines the EU’s external security agenda of
“effective multilateralism.” (8)
But China also has unresolved maritime sovereignty disputes with eight
countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia that could spiral into
armed conflict, and subsequently put European trade interests under
threat. Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful resolution through dialogue is
constantly restated, but China’s naval modernisation has already provoked
a shift in the national defence policies of its maritime neighbours. Japan
and Vietnam are implementing naval modernisation programs aimed at
balancing the rise of China’s naval power. (9) Besides actively developing
counter-anti-access defence technologies, the United States in late 2009
began implementing a new operational “AirSea Battle concept” that di-
rectly targets the PLAN. (10) In East Asia, the maritime sphere increasingly
is becoming an area of strategic rivalry. 
Unfortunately, despite the manifest importance of grasping the implica-
tions for Europe of these developments, the EU by and large lacks the ca-
pacity to independently assess China’s growing maritime power. European
policymakers tend to free ride on US expertise, and few European academ-
ics engage in PLA studies. (11) Among EU member states, the strategic as-
sessment departments in the Ministries of Defence put limited resources
into the study of the modernisation of the PLA, and rarely exchange infor-
mation with each other. (12)
There are indications, however, that Brussels is now willing to integrate
Asian military issues into the EU’s foreign and security policy towards
China. Three elements point in this direction, including: 
• the deterioration of maritime security in East Asia since 2008, with inci-
dents in which China has confronted Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
the US, all of which have collectively raised concerns that a crisis could
erupt that jeopardises European trade and economic interests in East Asia; 
• repeated requests by China’s neighbours asking the EU to issue a state-
ment calling for restraint and point out the lack of transparency of
China’s military modernisation; and
• the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which further federalises Euro-
pean foreign policy with the creation of the European External Action
Service (EEAS) and a high representative for Foreign and Security Policy
of the EU who also serves as the vice-president of the EU Commission.
The EEAS will be equipped with more efficient tools to monitor strategic
developments in East Asia. 
Furthermore, two member states have gone further in addressing poten-
tial risks related to China’s military modernisation. France’s 2008 White
paper on defence identifies the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles
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as a new vulnerability for Europe, implicitly giving a justification for
France’s longer-range submarine launched M51 missiles (11,000 km) capa-
ble of reaching East Asia and operational since 2010. It addresses Asian and
Chinese issues, expressing concern for the EU’s 75 percent dependence on
oil while China and India’s demand is rising, citing the possibility of “com-
petition and possibly even conflict” over energy resources. (13) Stating that
Britain currently faces “no major state military threat,” London’s National
Security Strategy issued in October 2010 describes – without referring to
China – how some states use cyberspace for espionage “from a safe dis-
tance.” (14)
The regional priorities of the PLAN's
modernisation: Implications for Europe of
China’s bastion strategy
The Chinese navy’s current objective is to replace its obsolete vessels and
extend its radius of operations beyond the first island chain. By 2025, the
PLAN will have built a force structure similar to that of the French Navy
during the Cold War. It will have expanded the area covered by its air arm,
commissioned two aircraft carriers, commissioned six to eight new nuclear
attack submarines (Shang-class follow on) for blockade operations beyond
the island chains against the adversary’s sea lanes of communications, (15)
and probably three more Jin-class follow-on ballistic missile submarines to
perform counter-attack, deterrence, and anti-access operations. Power
projection in Europe’s traditional spheres of influence – Africa and the Mid-
dle East – is currently not a priority of China’s maritime modernisation.
Several Chinese experts defend the need to develop a “Mahanian” navy to
protect the expansion of Chinese economic interests. (16) But an analysis fo-
cused on equipment procurement suggests the regional priorities that un-
derpin China’s naval modernisation.
Chinese strategists tend to display a comprehensive sense of China’s
maritime vulnerability, including traditional and non-traditional threats
(see Table 1). So far, China has not yet elaborated a comprehensive mar-
itime strategy to tackle this wide range of perceived threats in an inte-
grated way, although military and civilian experts have been commis-
sioned to propose ideas and recommendations to integrate threat percep-
tions and operational doctrine into a single strategy paper. (17) Still, China
does have a fairly clear hierarchy of goals. Gaining effective control over its
claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East and South China Seas
stands out as a priority and serves as a guiding principle, albeit a very loose
one, for China’s maritime policies. This regional priority is driven by sover-
eignty and economic considerations, but its military rationale is also very
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Table 1 – China’s comprehensive approach to maritime security: 
security sectors seen by Chinese naval experts
Security sector Interests and stakes Current threat assessment Tasks and missions
Political security
Sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and protection 
of China’s rights on sea
Foreign occupation 
of Chinese territory
Crisis management, back a 
political solution, recover 
by force
Political-military security National unification
Taiwan Independence 
Movement
Contain and divide
Political-territorial security Counter-interference
US maritime surveillance, 
Japanese MSDF* expansion
Getting prepared
Economic security
Economic interests resource 
exploitation
Resources plundered, 
vulnerability of SLOC**, 
smuggling
Enhance the struggle
Societal security Public security at sea
Piracy, smuggling, crime, 
terrorism
Hit and prevent
Environmental security
Maritime ecology 
protection
Pollution, disasters Control and prevention
* Maritime Self-Defence Forces ** Sea lines of communication
Source: Feng Liang (ed), Zhongguo de heping fazhan yu haishang anquan huanjing, (China’s Peaceful Development and Maritime Security Environment), Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2010, p. 293. Author’s translation.
strong. Establishing sea and air superiority over the area claimed as Chi-
nese maritime territory would enable China to enforce a naval bastion
strategy ( haijun lengbao zhanlue 海军棱堡战略 ). Accordingly, in establish-
ing control over the deep waters in the East and South China Seas, China
would secure space for its strategic submarines to operate safely from air
threats and perform nuclear deterrence missions.
There seems to be no intention in China to build a carrier-centred navy
focused on power projection, despite some analyses suggesting the con-
trary. (18) Although no tactical guideline has ever been published on the use
of aircraft carriers, there are reasons to think that they are most likely
going to be used to help protect China’s strategic submarine fleet’s area of
operations; extend the fleet’s radius of operations out across the first island
chain; enforce China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea; and per-
form high-profile humanitarian operations to increase China’s military
diplomatic influence and soft power. This can be traced back to the history
of China’s aircraft carriers ambitions.
The current interest in aircraft carriers seems to have originated with Liu
Huaqing’s visit onboard the USS Kitty Hawk in May 1980. Liu “immedi-
ately advocated the development of aircraft carriers to the PLA General
Staff and created a course for future carrier’s captains.” According to Liu,
justification for aircraft carriers found a rationale in the Taiwanese puzzle:
When we were focusing on the Taiwan Strait issue [1994] we re-
alised that using land based aviation was a waste because we would
increasingly need more planes and more air bases. And if we devel-
oped an aircraft carrier, we would not need to increase the total
number of planes. We would just need to modify them…The aircraft
carrier would become a force multiplier, augmenting the fire power
of the whole force. (19)
By 2015, China should be able to produce about 15-20 carrier-capable
aircraft and train enough pilots to give its carrier a basic capability as an
air defence platform, similar to those of the Russian Kuznetsov, with about
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Table 2 – Current Estimates of Chinese Paramilitary Formations Engaged in Maritime Surveillance
Source: Feng Liang (ed), Zhongguo de heping fazhan yu haishang anquan huanjing, (China’s Peaceful Development and Maritime Security Environment), Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2010, p. 293. Author’s translation.
Maritime Safety 
Administration 
of the PRC (MSA)
Fishery Law 
Enforcement 
Command
China Maritime 
Surveillance 
Administration
(CMS)
Coast 
Guards
Customs, 
maritime arm
Overseeing 
authority 
Ministry of 
Transportation, 
State Council
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
State Council
State Oceanic 
Administration
Ministry of Public 
Security
General 
Administration of 
Customs of the PRC
Name in Chinese 
Zhongguo jiaotongbu
haishiju haixun
中国交通部
海事局海巡
Zhongguo nongyebu
Zhongguo yuzheng
中国农业部
中国渔政
Guojia haiyangju
zhongguo haijian
国家海洋局
中国海监
Gongan bianfang 
haijing
公安边防海警
Zhongguo haiguan
中国海关
Missions 
Ensuring the 
safety of traffic
Prevent illegal 
fishing, enforce 
fisheries claims
Environmental 
protection
Public security, 
national law offences
Anti-smuggling 
in ports
Type of ships UNARMED ARMED
ARMED 
(light guns, 
machine guns)
ARMED 
(37mm guns), some
anti-aircraft 
machine guns
ARMED
Estimation of the
number of ships 
200+ patrol boats
Only two over 
1000 tonnes
100+ patrol boats
10- decommissioned
PLAN ships
70+ patrol boats
100+ Type- 
218 patrol boats.
Two former Jianghu-
1 frigate
150+ patrol vessels
Comments Will receive a 
5400 tonne cutter 
in 2012 
• The Yuzheng-310 is
currently its only heli-
copter-carrying ship 
• The Yuzheng-311 is a
former PLAN subma-
rine-salvage vessel
• Sent to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku in
November 2010 at the
height of the dispute
with Japan. 
20 fighters, 15 helicopters, and four training aircraft. (20) China has built
copies of the Russian fighter-bomber Su-33 (J-15) and is producing its own
carrier-flight trainer, the J-9. (21) Having acquired the Ka-31 early warning
helicopter from Russia, China is also developing a small carrier-borne early
warning plane. (22) The ex-Varyag’s military potential should be considered
as representing one eighth that of an American aircraft carrier and one
fourth that of the current French carrier with limited strike outside of YJ-
83K missiles. (23)
The ex-Varyag should be used in China’s maritime periphery, first for
training in the Yellow Sea in the immediate period after it completes its sea
trials, later in the South China Sea, where it can be used to counter the ter-
ritorial claims of China’s small neighbours to features of the Spratly islands.
The construction of a new submarine base at Sanya on Hainan Island sug-
gests that the new strategic submarines will also be based in the South
China Sea. Safeguarding the patrol areas of the SSBNs (24) would conform
to a historically Soviet-inspired “bastion” concept of carrier employment.
Such an approach would assign a defensive mission for the carrier, using it
to protect the PLAN’s SSBNs so as to create the conditions for a credible
second strike capability by keeping US submarines, ships, and aircraft away
from China’s maritime periphery. The Taiwan contingency also remains a
potential arena in which the carrier may be employed. From a military per-
spective, the characteristics of the ex-Varyag would enable her to attack
Taiwan’s east coast from Hainan using her fighter wing to protect its sub-
marine patrol areas from Japanese and US patrol maritime aircrafts during
a Taiwan confrontation. A Chinese carrier could also participate in human-
itarian relief operations, and provide strategic support for repatriation op-
erations such as those associated with the evacuation of PRC nationals
from Libya in early 2011. Outside of these roles, it seems unlikely that
China would employ for offensive operations an asset designed for secur-
ing China’s peripheral areas.
Underwater weapons represent a powerful dimension of China’s area de-
nial architecture. China sees the submarines as an asymmetric answer to
delay the progression of US naval forces while the PLA would try to secure
victory in Taiwan. To perform this area denial strategy, it is likely that China
will field up to 20 air independent propulsion submarines and 30 conven-
tional submarines within the next ten years to extend “the reach of naval
defence” across the first island chain (i.e., out to 500-1000 nautical miles).
Chinese authors appear to believe that anti-submarine missions should be
left to the conventional submarine fleet and to the use of minefields.
All new Chinese conventional submarines are armed with anti-ship cruise
missiles and some with land-attack cruise missiles. The modern and con-
ventional submarines (i.e., the Kilo, Song, and Yuan-class boats) would
stand a good chance of remaining undetected while attempting to am-
bush US task forces. In addition, China may use Russian super-cavitating,
high-speed underwater rockets (Skvall) and already fields Russian wake-
homing (53-65) and anti-submarine (Test-71) torpedoes that are difficult
to evade. Defensive minefields laid in advance could be activated or deac-
tivated when required.
A Chinese naval force of about ten ships reached the Pacific at the be-
ginning of 2010 by following the shores of Okinawa and Miyako, causing
consternation in Japan and demonstrating the PLAN’s ability to break
out of the inner island chain. Within ten years China should have about
20-22 air defence and cruise missile destroyers, 25 air defence frigates
and 30 patrol corvettes. Destroyers will be essential in protecting China’s
future aircraft carrier(s). The PLAN’s best destroyers (052B/C) and
frigates (054A) are already attached to the Southern fleet where the fu-
ture carrier will most likely be based. (25) The 052C (Luyang II) destroyer
has been chosen as the preferred class with the third and fourth
launched in 2010-2011 at the new Jiangnan shipyard. By 2020, China will
have about 20-22 air defence and cruise missiles destroyers, compared
with only 13 at present. Some of the new ships will have better anti-sub-
marine capabilities than China’s current fleet. They will replace the re-
maining nine Luda (051) vessels.
China does not have enough destroyers to meet its needs, so it must
continue producing frigates. A further 15 frigates of 054A Jiangkai II-class,
or modified versions of this type, will probably be built by 2020 for a total
of at least 25. A smaller corvette (056), less sophisticated and less costly
than the Jiangkai II, should replace the obsolete Jianghus. (26)
In a specialised journal published by the China Shipbuilding Industry Cor-
poration, Jiang Yu (a pen name) estimates that by 2020 the naval air arm
will have 200 long-range attack aircrafts. Priority will be given to concen-
trating naval resources in the East and South China Seas. By 2020, the East-
ern fleet will possess 120 modern aircraft of JH-7A, SU-30Mk2, J-10, and
J-11 classes to accompany the H-6s on attack missions within a radius of
400 nm. The Southern fleet will have about 100 aircraft capable of in-flight
refuelling as well as the carrier battle group that can handle conflicts in the
Spratly Islands. (27)
From now on, naval air cover and stealth missile-carrying catamarans
will take on most combat operations in in-shore areas (up to 200 nm), re-
placing units without integrated combat systems. In peacetime, fishery
protection and surveillance missions will be performed by the armed po-
lice, which is being provided with vessels decommissioned by the PLA
Navy, and by civil paramilitary organisations, as described in Table 2. In dis-
puted areas, such civilian-manned vessels are better suited to reducing
tensions with neighbouring powers. (28)
China has also doubled its sealift capability in the past 15 years in re-
sponse to the perceived threat from the Taiwanese independence move-
ment. China’s combined landing crafts could carry at least 30,000 troops
and probably as many as 60,000 troops, including 37,000 on small, poten-
tially unseaworthy vessels (see Table 3). Therefore, the widely-accepted es-
timate of a total sealift capacity of just 10,000-20,000 troops by 2020 –
about two brigades – probably underestimates China’s current and future
sealift capabilities. (29) In addition, by 2025 a series of landing dock ships
and possibly helicopter carriers should be available to replace China’s older
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tank landing ships, thus greatly enhancing the PLA’s ability to project force
across the Taiwan Strait. (30)
China has also made progress in developing command, control, commu-
nications, and intelligence (C3I) systems based on a very low-frequency
radio system for communicating with its submarines and on Loran and
Changhe long-wave navigation systems, which can be used for operations
up to 1,000 nautical miles. From 2020 onwards, Chinese C3I will probably
centre on the use of five geostationary and 30 high-earth orbiting satel-
lites. China may have a fully integrated global information system by 2020.
Jiang Yu writes that “the period from 2010 to 2020 will be crucial in getting
the navy equipped with integrated combat systems ( xitong peitao de
zuozhan zhuangbei tixi系统配套的作战装备体系 ) so that it will be able to
fight on the high seas.” (31) China’s procurement of new space systems will
enhance its ability to detect and target naval activity in the Western Pa-
cific Ocean following the Soviet example of active and passive radar satel-
lites capable of collecting information on a target ship every 20 to 30 min-
utes for a duration that could exceed 70 days. (32)
China is developing long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMS) and
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) that can be fired from land bases,
bombers, submarines, and destroyers to attack targets, including air and
naval bases, in Taiwan, Japan, or Guam. 
Last but not least, the Second Artillery would play a central role in any con-
frontation with Taiwan because its forces now possess sufficient range and ac-
curacy to target US forces in Japan and South Korea. (33) The 2002 edition of
the Second Artillery’s Science of Campaigns shows how its missiles could help
the air force and the navy achieve air and maritime superiority by striking the
enemy’s air and naval bases (34) and by creating maritime exclusion zones for
aircraft carriers. (35) Anti-ship ballistic missiles also complicate US war plan-
ning. In a December 2010 interview with Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, Pacific Com-
mand (PACOM) Commander Admiral Robert Willard asserted that the
Dongfeng-21D (DF-21D) has reached an “initial operational capability.” (36)
The implications for Europe of these PLA modernisations are two-fold. 
On the one hand, European economic and trade interests could suffer
from a maritime conflict in East Asia. In the South China Sea, the key issue
is whether China will be able to achieve a transformation of the status quo
through peaceful means and to what extent the various claimants have in-
centives to negotiate and compromise. As the strongest naval power in
Southeast Asia (not including the United States Navy), China’s incentive to
employ a coercion strategy and checkmate Southeast Asian states is high.
Although their influence on the decision-making process should be put
into perspective, some voices within China explicitly call for military ac-
tions in the South China Sea. (37) Statistics remain to be compiled on the
importance of the European Union maritime trade in East Asia, precisely
because the EU has not taken the risks of conflict seriously. (38) But any
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Table 3 – Estimates for the Order of Battle Evolu-
tion, 2011-2025 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on shipbuilding projections. Saunders, 
Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2011-12, pp. 129-168
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2011 2025
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines
3+1 
(old)
6
Conventionally-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarines
1 - 
Nuclear-powered attack submarines 4 10
Air independent propulsion submarines 6 22
Diesel electric submarines 28 28
Obsolete diesel electric submarines 27 10
Aircraft carrier 1 2
Old anti-ship missile destroyers 18 - 
Air defense/long range anti-ship 
destroyers
67 25
General purpose destroyers 3
Air defence frigates 10
General purpose frigates 45 30
Landing dock ships 2 6
Landing tank ships 38 38
Small landing ships
58
40
Mine countermeasures vessels
20 
(+80) 
50
Patrol boats 55 100-150 
Fleet support ships 6 8
25
conflict would suddenly disrupt the flow of Chinese products to the West-
ern hemisphere, causing shortages in many sectors made dependent on
those imports by the massive deindustrialisation process in the European
Union. In addition, trans-Atlantic solidarity may drag the EU into a conflict
were one to erupt between China and the US over the South China Sea.
During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, for example, the US formulated
initial requests for support and assistance to allies in Europe. (39)
On the other hand, the prospects for maritime competition with China
in the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, or even the Mediterranean Sea are
distant, and there is room for cooperation. There is no stated ambition
from Beijing to project maritime power in these areas. (40) Still, there is
clearly no guarantee that China’s strategy will not change. Realist interna-
tional relations literature argues that intentions change with the accumu-
lation of power. But while for Europe, the potential challenges of the PLAN
modernisation rest primarily with maritime security issues in East Asia, Eu-
rope-China interactions in the military sphere during the past three
decades have resulted in a hugely significant European contribution to the
modernisation of the PLAN. 
Europe’s contribution to China’s naval
modernisation before and after the embargo
As Liu Huaqing stated in his memoirs, buying foreign weapons is an in-
termediary step to learn foreign techniques and fill gaps in capabilities and
time. China’s ultimate goal is to access the industrial capacity to produce
advanced weapons without foreign technical assistance because foreigners
won’t share their newest techniques and do not have the same require-
ments. (41)
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms opened the door for Western capitalism
and technologies alike to enter China. (42) With Washington’s approval, the
NATO allies (mainly UK, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy)
transferred armaments or dual-use technologies that helped upgrade the
PLA in general and the PLAN in particular. For example, the Chinese Navy
acquired:
– naval combat systems such as the Thomson CSF Tavitac from France
and the ZJK-4, a Chinese copy of the Alenia Marconi Systems from Italy
– French air defence missiles in the form of Thomson CSF’s Crotale Naval 
– guns (French Creusot-Loire 100mm Compact)
– anti-submarine sensors in the form of the French Thomson Syntra
sonars, including the DUUX-5 and DUBV-23 that inspired the SJD-8/9
and the DUBV-43
– French, Dutch, and Italian radars, including Thomson CSF’s Sea Tiger, an
export version of the French Navy DBRV-15, S-Band, 80 NM range;
Dutch civilian air search REL-1, L-Band, 130 NM; Italian RAN 10S (that
inspired Chinese Type 518 and 360 Seagul on Luhu-class destroyers and
Jiangwei I/II -class and Jiangkai I-class frigates)
– electronic warfare systems (Dutch Hollandse Signaal Apparaten
Rapids/Ramese; perhaps French DR2000U, Alligator X-band)
– Italian torpedoes (Whitehead A244S)
– naval helicopters (Aerospatiale Dauphin)
– jet engines (Rolls-Royce Spey engines)
– composite materials technology (from British Petroleum America and
Sikorsky)
– Mark 46 Anti-Submarine Warfare torpedoes
– and diesel engines (French Pielstick, German MTU). (43)
During the 1980s, thanks mainly to these European equipment transfers –
in comparison, the United States only sold Gas turbines, helicopters, chaffs,
and perhaps sonar – the Chinese Navy was able to upgrade or retrofit a
dozen platforms (Luhu-class destroyers, Jiangwei I/II-class frigates, some old
Luda-class destroyers) with better defensive capabilities. Even so, the gap be-
tween the Chinese Navy and the Soviet Pacific fleet remained considerable.
China also developed the Exocet-like C-801 anti-ship missile and later made
its own variant, the C-802, using a French small reactor from the company
Microturbo. A limited number of those small turbo reactors had been sold
legally to China. (44) These forms of technology assistance helped the PLAN
begin to recover from years of neglect during the Cultural Revolution.
The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre resulted in a Western arms em-
bargo limiting further weapons sales. European companies were neverthe-
less authorised to complete the contracts they had signed with China be-
fore 1989. In the aftershock of Washington’s spectacular victory in the
1991 Gulf War against an entrenched army resembling the PLA, Beijing re-
defined its doctrine to be able to win “local wars under high-tech condi-
tions,” focusing on an approach built around “active defence.” Modern
technology was deemed to be the key to China’s military transformation.
With the end of the Cold War, formal military relations resumed with Rus-
sia. A starving post-Soviet defence industry was eager to secure Chinese or-
ders and replace lost orders from East European militaries. However, the
end of the Cold War also meant the lifting of restrictions on the export of
Western dual-use technologies. Partially circumnavigating the Tiananmen
embargo, China acquired space, laser, and ballistic missile technologies
from the US, and aircraft, helicopters, ground vehicles, radars, marine en-
gines, and machine tools from Europe. (45)
During the 9th and 10th five-year plans, China used Franco-German Piel-
stick civilian marine diesel engines to power every single one of its new
frigates, amphibious ships, and auxiliary vessels. Those civilian diesel engines
lacked the endurance of their military equivalents and were prone to failure
at high speeds; however, they were key to China’s naval modernisation. The
design for the Jiangkai I/II-class frigates looked so similar to French
LaFayette-class frigates sold to Taiwan that some argued that France had
passed the blueprints on to China or that some information had filtered out
from Taiwan. It seems, however, that this design was due mainly to China’s
careful study of all available data. Song-class conventional submarines were
clearly inspired by the French Agosta; the information had most likely come
from an operator and strategic ally, Pakistan. These platforms merged for-
eign technologies acquired legally or through espionage and resulted in
genuine and apparently successful Chinese designs.
Knowing French and Italian combat systems, China’s 709 Institute is re-
ported to have developed a local area network to integrate the ship’s sen-
sors and weapons fire-control systems. China also copied Russian technol-
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ogy, and many of China’s most recent weapon systems are predominantly
based on Russian systems. Prominent exceptions include the Type 730
anti-missile gun, which is very similar to the Dutch Goalkeeper; a radar
reminiscent of the Thales Smart-L; and an outright copy of the US-German
RAM Close-In Weapons System for end-stage missile defence. This analysis
is based on resemblances between systems. Generally there is not enough
information available to pinpoint an espionage case.
A global outlook: European-Chinese security
cooperation and industrial competition
The development of a blue-water capability by the PLA Navy could pres-
ent Europe and the international community with new opportunities for
maritime security cooperation. In many regional security crises, China is
seen by some in Europe as a “swing power”: if China remains neutral or op-
posed to a proposed international response, crisis resolution remains out
of reach. During the past decade, this has been the pattern in Sudan, Myan-
mar, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and Iran, with varying outcomes.
Most importantly for Europe, however, the Continent’s active diplomacy
has completely failed to secure Chinese support for European positions
and approaches. China has favoured a dialogue with the United States and
overlooked European security concerns and cooperation requests. This is
also true even in those areas of security policy where Beijing has incre-
mentally adopted an approach more convergent with Western norms and
practices, such as China’s evolving approach on nuclear non-proliferation,
which has moved in the direction of increasing convergence with the West,
but largely as a result of US, not EU, engagement. (46)
The trend in China to overlook European concerns and requests can also
be observed in the area of maritime security. In December 2008, the Cen-
tral Military Commission took the unprecedented decision to send a PLAN
flotilla to the Gulf of Aden to take part in an international counter-piracy
operation. As the PLA Navy’s first operational deployment outside of Asia,
the move raised expectations in Europe that a window of opportunity had
opened for bilateral cooperation in the maritime security sphere. The op-
erations in the Gulf of Aden offered a platform for European military-to-
military engagement with China at the operational level. Increased inter-
actions with the Chinese navy could ideally initiate a virtuous circle of
trust-building and mutual understanding.
At the same time, European naval officers and China-watchers were
aware that the PLAN was taking advantage of this deployment abroad to
gain operational experience. In the longer term, the operation could justify
a Chinese decision to set up naval bases abroad for logistical needs be-
cause of the PLAN’s limited capabilities for replenishment at sea. China
had strong economic incentives to secure the area, such as the rise of mar-
itime transportation insurance costs, (47) which explains the CMC’s decision
better than China’s ambition to become a responsible stakeholder in mar-
itime security. On the whole, however, China’s decision was welcome in
Europe because the potential for setting up cooperative security mecha-
nisms at sea exceeded the uncertainties over China’s long-term strategic
intentions.
At first China escorted Chinese and Taiwanese ships, outside of the three
international coalitions, operation Atalanta (EU operation), operation Ocean
Shield (NATO operation), and Combined Task Force-151 (a 25 nations coali-
tion under US command). Communications with other navies were limited,
and direct contacts with European naval ships were kept to a minimal level.
The United States took the lead in interacting with the PLAN, with the US
Navy being the first to establish contact. US-China communication has led
to an informal but intense dialogue at the tactical level with Combined Task
Force 151. (48) In Europe, the debate centred in 2010-2011 on China’s par-
ticipation in Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (SHADE), a dialogue
mechanism established in December 2008 to share information among
participating navies on a monthly basis. China favours a geographical sepa-
ration of the theatre of operations into responsibility zones where national
navies would escort ships independently but in a coordinated way. (49)
While naval cooperation with China was slow in evolving, the number of
ships attacked and hijacked kept rising throughout 2009 and 2010. (50) The
area where pirates operate now affects a wide area from the Red Sea to
the Seychelles and the Maldives, thus fuelling Indian anxieties about a Chi-
nese naval presence near the sub-continent. (51)
While there is still room for improvement in EU-PRC naval cooperation,
Europe and China are also competing over lucrative arms markets. For a
long time Chinese naval weapons could not meet Western standards. Their
poor quality and lower prices meant that they were a second best for
countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Albania, and Roma-
nia. The sale of eight Chinese warships and offshore patrol vessels to Thai-
land since the late 1980s marked a change. Although those vessels re-
vealed serious shortcomings, they were purchased as an alternative to
more expensive Western warships, and four – two large frigates and two
offshore patrol vessels – were fitted with American systems obtained
under the US FMS program. More recently, China has modernised Pakistani
frigates, built two frigates and assisted in the indigenous construction of a
third for Pakistan with Chinese weapons systems, including copies of
French Crotale and Italian Aspide air defence missiles. This latter program
came as a substitute to the purchase of second-hand Western platforms.
Pakistan is also said to have selected China over France and Germany for
the construction of its future Air Independent Propulsion submarines. (52)
Chinese experts argue that arms sales to Pakistan serve as a window to
showcase Chinese naval technologies to Middle East countries. (53) China is
now likely to offer an alternative to Western designs in the Asian, African,
and South American markets. Chinese shipbuilders have participated in the
Chilean Exponaval since 2002 and could tender for the modernisation of
the Ecuadorian Navy and perhaps the construction of a Brazilian aircraft
carrier at the end of the decade, in direct competition with France. (54)
The arms embargo: Assessing Europe’s
calculated ambiguity
The EU arms embargo towards China is the only EU embargo adopted
before the construction of a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP)
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under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. As such, the EU arms embargo against
China is not a “common position” of the European Union, but a non-legally
binding political declaration of the Council. It leaves open room for inter-
pretation by member states on non-lethal arms, dual technologies, infor-
mation exchange, training, and software. This distinction is reflected in Chi-
nese by two different terms, “comprehensive embargoes” ( quanmian
jinyun 全面禁运 ) as against “non-comprehensive embargoes” ( fei quan-
mian jinyun 非全面禁运 ). (55) The 1989 EU arms embargo differs greatly
from the 14 other arms embargoes that the EU was enforcing in early
2011. (56) It leaves room for some military transfers, albeit marginal. In ad-
dition, transfers of dual-use technologies and non-lethal military systems
to China are not subject to strict European-level export controls. European
arms embargoes usually include standardised language banning all kinds of
military cooperation with targeted countries, including “prohibition to
grant, sell, supply, or transfer technical assistance, brokering services and
other services related to military activities.” (57) As a result, according to of-
ficial European statistics, in 2009, five European countries exported 58.6
million euros’ worth of military technologies to China (not including Hong
Kong and Macau), and issued licenses worth 209.4 million euros, while 35
licences were denied to China. (58) As to the flow of dual technologies, it is
currently not being tracked in any systematic way. 
In 2003-2004, China pressed the EU to lift the arms embargo by using
several arguments, including: 
– the arms embargo was outdated because China had changed;
– lifting the embargo would be a largely symbolic decision;
– China could not be compared to other states under European embar-
goes; and
– the embargo was preventing the emergence of a genuine EU-China
strategic partnership.
In Europe, anti-embargo advocates argued that it would not result in
major arms sales and that the level of transfers of military technologies
would remain stable. Michèle Alliot-Marie, then French Minister of De-
fence, stated that since the modernisation of China’s defence industry was
irreversible, lifting the arms embargo would slow down the modernisation
of China’s military-industrial complex because it would remove an incen-
tive to self-reliance. (59)
At the same time, several European states and arms companies were se-
riously contemplating the prospect of selling weapons systems to China,
while Chinese experts were listing the benefits that China could derive,
contradicting the argument made by Michèle Alliot-Marie. For example,
the Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)-sponsored magazine
Naval and Merchant Ships explained that French technology would help
reduce a growing gap with American 4th and 5th generation fighters: “[Even]
if none of the European fighters can compete with the F-22 and F-35,
French Rafale and European Typhoon are [still] considered to be better
than the upgraded American 3rd and 4th generation aircraft sold to Taiwan
and other Asian neighbours. Intermediary 3rd and 4th generation techniques
are [thus] needed and acquiring European 3rd and 4th generation fighters
would help train better pilots and close the gap with America’s consider-
able advance.” (60)
In 2004-2005, there were calls in Europe to link termination of the em-
bargo to human rights. Again in 2007, EU Commissioner for External Rela-
tions Benita Ferrero-Waldner told Premier Wen Jiabao that three human
rights conditions had to be met before the lifting of the arms embargo. (61)
Other experts called for reciprocity. François Godement and John Fox sug-
gested lifting the embargo in exchange for Chinese cooperation to prevent
Iran from developing nuclear weapons. (62) Beijing has thus far rejected the
notion of a grand bargain with Europe to lift the embargo. Hence China has
never clearly explained what would be the benefits for the EU of lifting the
arms embargo beyond a vague assurance that the comprehensive strategic
partnership would be enhanced – and the unstated but clear benefits for
European arms trading companies. In addition, despite the gradually fading
hope of encouraging China’s transformation into a liberal democracy in the
face of Beijing’s persistent refusal to pursue political reform, there has still
been no consensus in Europe over what policy goals should be achieved
through the lifting of the arms embargo.
The construction of an EU-level arms-control mechanism is still a work
in progress. In March 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that
the adoption of a strict and legally-binding Code of Conduct was the sine
qua non condition for lifting the embargo. (63) Such an approach would
have included a unified list of items banned from export to China. In 2004-
2005, (64) Washington tried to limit European Union defence and dual-use
technology exports to China by suggesting – so far unsuccessfully – a new
version of the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Ex-
port Controls (CoCom).
On 8 December 2008, the EU Council finally replaced its 1998 non-
legally binding Code of Conduct with Common Position 2008/944/CSFP. (65)
The Common Position was adopted as a means of reinforcing the EU’s ex-
port control mechanisms, and without being linked to the post-Tiananmen
China arms embargo. Member states are obliged to bring their policies into
line with the Common Position, but the implementation is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. (66) Under the Common
Position, European exports of military technology must respect eight cri-
teria, including the respect for human rights in the country of destination;
the preservation of regional peace, security, and stability; and limitations
on the risk of re-export. The adoption of the Common Position reinforces
the EU’s arms control mechanisms, but a certain amount of ambiguity re-
mains regarding the extent to which the Common Position can prevail over
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individual members’ export decisions based on national interests. Each
member can still make its own interpretation of the Common Position to
justify arms transfers if it so chooses. (67)
Addressing the issue of dual-use technology transfers, the European
Council on 5 May 2009 adopted Regulation No. 428/2009 setting up a
Community regime for the export, transfer, brokering, and transit of dual-
use items. (68) The Regulation includes a list of dual-use items drawing from
the practice of multilateral international agreements and export control
regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, and the various international documents regulating the
international trade of dual-use items used in manufacturing Weapons of
Mass Destruction. But the final decision on implementation of the Regula-
tion still lies in the hands of the EU member states. (69)
In reality, the debate over lifting the arms embargo made the EU realise
the dramatic trans-Atlantic implications of such a decision. Threats of
sanctions and loss of access to the US market have effectively deterred Eu-
ropean defence firms such as the UK’s BAE Systems from supporting such
a move. (70) Officially, the EU still considers lifting the arms embargo an “ul-
timate goal,” but in practice there is a tacit agreement among European
governments that the issue should be set aside. No member state can
launch a credible policy review on this issue. Hence, when in late January
2010, Spain’s foreign minister said that Madrid was “weighing the pros and
the cons” of lifting the embargo, there was not even a strong public Chi-
nese reaction. (71) The sense among most serious observers of Spanish for-
eign policy was that Spain was pushing its own China agenda, not describ-
ing a serious EU-wide position. Indeed, since the 2007 10th EU-China sum-
mit, mention of the arms embargo has been removed from the final joint
communiqués of the annual summits. (72)
The 2011 financial crisis in Europe provided China with a new opportu-
nity to raise the embargo issue. In November 2011, European countries
asked Beijing to pursue European Sovereign Bonds through the Financial
Stability Fund. On a subsequent trip to Europe, President Hu Jintao stated
that the easing of Europe’s restrictions on exports of high-technology
products was still a priority, without explicitly linking the lifting of the arms
embargo to possible Chinese assistance in overcoming Europe’s debt cri-
sis. (73) The major weakness of Europe’s calculated ambiguity is that China
can raise the embargo issue every time the EU attempts to further develop
the EU-China strategic partnership. But the likelihood of a European policy
shift on the embargo in the mid-term is very low, in view of the factors de-
scribed above.
The international Law of the Sea and
Europe’s long-term strategic interests
One of the problems encountered by Europe in crafting a policy towards
East Asian maritime disputes is that there is only a very slim chance that
international law will prove helpful in providing solutions to the competing
sovereignty claims and security problems of the region. China does not
recognise the competence of the International Court of Justice or other tri-
bunals for adjudicating maritime disputes. On 25 August 2006, the Chinese
government added a reservation under Article 298 of the United Nation
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), under which it does not ac-
cept UNCLOS procedures to solve most categories of territorial disputes. (74)
Article 298 defines compulsory procedures for legally binding decisions in
case of dispute between signatory states. China thus rejects the compe-
tence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLS), the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) or any arbitration tribunal to settle disputes
related to sea boundary delimitations, military activities and “disputes in re-
spect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the
functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations.” (75)
Even before the ITLS, the outcome of a settlement on the sovereignty
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands would be unpredictable, given the flaws
of both China’s and Japan’s legal arguments. (76) The situation in the South
China Sea is slightly different. “Historical rights” ( lishixing quanli历史性权
利 ) are used as a basis for China’s territorial claims under article 14 of the
1998 Law of the PRC on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf. (77) China’s re-
jection of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-
LOS)’s geographical approach to territorial delimitation in the South China
Sea, based on the distance from the seashores, is not acceptable to the EU.
So far, European countries individually, and the EU as a whole, like the
United States, have refrained from taking a stance on sovereignty in the
South China Sea.
The EU’s interpretation of UNCLOS also diverges from China’s on the
definition of innocent passage in Economic Exclusive Zones. The Chinese
government signed UNCLOS in 1982. When the Chinese delegation de-
posited its ratification instrument with the United Nations on 7 June 1996,
it made four reservations, stating, “The provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through
the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal state to request,
in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign state to obtain ad-
vance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal state for the
passage of its warships through the territorial sea of the coastal state.” (78)
In 2002, China passed a law restricting survey and mapping activities in
its EEZ and requiring foreign states to obtain permission from the Chinese
authorities before conducting such surveys. China is among the 12 states
that retain laws asserting the right to regulate military activities in their
EEZ. (79) The international Law of the Sea limits a state’s sovereignty over
its EEZ to economic exploitation and scientific exploration. But while the
regime of the territorial seas applies to economic activity, the regime of
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the high seas applies to military activities. Therefore, the legal basis for
coastal states to reject other states’ military activities in their EEZ, includ-
ing surveillance and exercises, is weak. UNCLOS puts forward the notion of
“due regard” that states should have to the rights and duties of coastal
states, and of compliance to the national laws and regulations of the
coastal states. Moreover, military activities in the EEZ of a coastal state
could be interpreted in some cases as threatening and thus inconsistent
with both the 1982 UNCLOS and the UN Charter.
However, China rejects activities that it considers hostile, such as “espi-
onage.” Mark Valencia, a maritime security expert at the Nautilus Institute,
argues that China could tolerate passive collection of electronic intelli-
gence, but that interference with Chinese military communications to test
its defensive systems would provoke a military reaction. (80) China has also
remained ambiguous on whether the Chinese Navy would enforce the re-
jection of military activities without prior notification only in China’s in-
ternationally recognised EEZ – calculated from China’s coastal baseline –
or also in the maritime territories claimed by the PRC in the East and
South China Seas.
The restrictions that the Chinese government wants to apply to innocent
passage in China’s claimed EEZ are problematic for Europe for several rea-
sons:
– They represent a factor of strategic instability that has caused military
incidents such as the March 2009 harassment of the US surveillance
ship USNS Impeccable by Chinese paramilitary forces 75 miles south of
Hainan. (81)
– Unlike the EU – and despite the fact that it has not ratified the UNCLOS
– the United States refers to UNCLOS to legitimate its military activities
in China’s EEZ. Risks of naval incidents with European military vessels
are minimal since France, Britain, and Germany’s annual or biannual de-
ployments to China are related to pre-approved port-visits, not military
intelligence collection efforts.
– China’s rejection of innocent passage in its EEZ may be part of a revi-
sionist strategy on the international Law of the Sea that could contra-
dict European interests. With the exception of Portugal, the EU over-
whelmingly supports UNCLOS as the basis for international maritime
security. In the past, China has successfully built large coalitions at the
Human Rights Council of the United Nations. China’s legal revisionism
could weaken the EU and US positions. (82)
Conclusion: Understanding the EU’s true
strategic relevance vis-à-vis China
The EU has more interests in PLAN modernisation and maritime security
in East Asia than has traditionally been recognised. Indeed, the modernisa-
tion of the PLAN raises bilateral, trans-Atlantic, and global issues for the
EU’s nascent common foreign and security policies.
On the bilateral EU-China front, the first challenge for Europe is to rein-
force its independent capacity to engage in strategic assessment; other-
wise it will not be able to break away from a normative approach that fails
to address China’s military modernisation in a comprehensive manner.
There is a need in Europe for strategic reassurance on long-term Chinese
intentions, as there is a need for assurances that China will exercise self-
restraint in its maritime disputes with weaker neighbours.
European policies should focus on simple goals: making European con-
cerns clear and unambiguous to China; and integrating maritime security
into the Europe-China strategic dialogue and into European dialogues with
the US and East Asian states. Only through such a process will Europe be
able to explore cooperative engagements with China on counter-piracy,
non-combatant evacuation operations, and rescue and relief operations on
a sound basis.
Europe has a strong interest in bringing China into full compliance with
UNCLOS. Chinese restrictions on freedom of navigation for military ships
in the EEZ, and the notion of “historical maritime rights,” run counter to
French and British approaches to the Law of the Sea. In a crisis, those gaps
would increase the difficulty for Europe and China of finding common
ground for crisis resolution. Additionally, Europe should pay attention to
the challenges posed by China’s adoption of a strategy of “legal warfare,”
which seeks to form an international coalition to renegotiate the UNCLOS,
undermining European interests.
Furthermore, the trans-Atlantic partnership determines to a large extent
the EU’s approach to maritime security in East Asia. There is no reason to
think that new conditions would allow termination of the arms embargo
towards China. The trans-Atlantic partnership could also drag Europe into
a maritime conflict in East Asia. If the US intervened militarily in a regional
crisis, European allies would almost certainly be asked to contribute polit-
ically or militarily. As such, Europe should press the United States to ratify
UNCLOS in order to reinforce Europe and US common positions on this
issue.
Finally, competition on the international arms market seems inevitable,
and Europe will need to think hard about how it can stop the leakage of
sensitive military and dual-use technologies to China.
In the short and longer terms, the EU and China have a number of com-
mon interests in international stability that call for improving naval coop-
eration, including humanitarian relief operations, repatriation operations
from war zones, and anti-piracy operations. The maritime front will thus
remain an area where increased engagement between the EU and China
should be pursued.
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